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This study examines the effect of audit quality and audit committee 
effectiveness on earnings management in manufacturing company with 
effectiveness of audit committee as moderating variable. This study uses 300 
samples from manufacturing company listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange during the period of 2016-2018, and it is determined by using 
purposive sampling method. The data used in this study is secondary data 
which contains company financial information and annual reports obtained 
from Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and Bloomberg. This research is using 
multiple regression analysis as data analysis technique. The result shows that 
there is a significant negative effect towards the specialization of auditors 
moderated by audit committee on earnings management. However, the 
auditor's reputation moderated by the audit committee has a positive and 
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Companies, with an effective 
corporate governance mechanism, are 
considered capable to reduce the chance of 
management to manipulate earnings 
supported by the presence of a board of 
commissioners, audit committee, internal 
auditors and external auditors. Furthermore, 
earnings management can occur because of 
the difference of goals between the agent 
(manager) and principal (shareholders or 
company owners) which causes agency 
problems. 
Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) provides flexibility 
related to the selection of an accounting 
system that allows managers to use reporting 
methods and design financial projections for 
the future period in accordance with the field 
and background of the business entity. 
Therefore, this accrual principle is usually 
misused by management to maximize the 
profits of managers and companies by 
manipulating earnings (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990).  
Schipper, (1989) (in Lin and Hwang, 
2010) states that earnings management 
practices are intervention activities carried 
out by managers for specific purposes in the 
process of presenting external financial 
statements in order to obtain a portion of 
profits from profitable company 
performance. Piot, C. and Janin, (2007) 
examined the important function of the audit 
committee in improving the quality of the 
audit process and reducing earnings 
management practices. While these results 
are not consistent with research (Xie 2003); 
Kwon 2007; Alhadab, et al. 2018) which 
found that the number of directors on the 
audit committee did not affect the decline in 
earnings management in the company. 
This study aims to examine and find 
empirical evidence of the influence of audit 
committees, industry specialization auditors, 
and tenure audits on earnings management 
with a sample of manufacturing industry 
companies on consumer goods, basic 
materials and chemical industries, and other 
industries listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2016-2018. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
Earnings management practices 
cannot be separated from agency theory. In 
the agency relationship, there is a contract 
agreed upon by both parties, manager and the 
owner of the company, which contains the 
delegation of duties and authority to the 
manager to operate the company. The agent 
has the desire to get compensation and 
bonuses from doing good performance by 
providing good financial reports. This means 
encouraging managers to report on the 
company's performance in a certain way to 
maximize their utility, by income 
maximization or minimization, eliminating 
certain assets, and income smoothing 
(Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, 1976). 
Managers use financial statements as 
a tool to report company’s performance, and 
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it is used by the principals, investors, 
creditors, and the public as a basis in 
decision-making process. Information gap 
owned by managers compared to 
shareholders resulted in the emergence of 
asymmetric information which was giving 
chance for managers to manipulate earnings. 
Thus, the implementation of effective and 
efficient corporate governance practices of 
the board of commissioners, audit 
committees, internal auditors, and external 
auditors can minimize the manipulation of 
earnings made by managers (Zgarni, et al. 
2016). 
 
The Effect of Effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee and Auditor of Industrial 
Specialization on Earnings Management 
Zgarni, et al. 2016 describes that the 
audit committee is responsible for protecting 
the rights of shareholders and overseeing the 
financial statements from bias. The existence 
of the audit committee as a mediator through 
with the agency theory becomes a support 
fundamental for the existence of audit 
committee as a mediator because the theory 
states that the transparency of the entity’s 
internal information provided by committee 
of audit to manager, company owner and 
external auditor can suppress the potential 
for agency theory and asymmetric 
information. The existence of an audit 
committee as a mediator is contradict to 
agency theory, because the potential for 
asymmetric changes in information and 
agency conflict can be suppressed by formal 
communication between audit committee 
with the principal and audit committee with 
management to use transparent and free 
financial reports. 
Furthermore, nowadays public 
accounting firms are increasing their focus 
on the larger industry. Therefore, the role of 
industry specialization auditors is very 
important in the audit process. Hakim and 
Omri (2010) (in Alves 2013) said that the 
position of auditors in the capital market 
world is very influential because it provides 
information and services that assess the 
fairness of financial statements and issue 
audit opinions. In practice, the auditor 
specialization cannot be directly observed 
because the expertise and experience of the 
industry specialization auditor are obtained 
from repeated audits. Therefore, the auditor 
specialization measurement can be measured 
with the market auditor industry shares based 
on client sales (Balsam, et al. 2003). 
Company manager who carries out 
earnings management will receive incentives 
from the results of managing the company. 
Therefore, an effective audit committee is 
expected to press managers to provide 
transparent financial statements, and 
specialized auditors can identify earnings 
manipulation practices more thoroughly and  
improve audit quality in contributing to the 
reliability of financial information (Balsam, 
et al. 2003). The above discussion leads to 
the following hypotheses: 
 H1: The effectiveness of the audit 
committee and industry specialization 




The Effect of Effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee and a Big Four Auditor on 
Earnings Management 
The audit process is one of the 
mechanisms that aims to obtain and evaluate 
audit evidence to reduce asymmetric 
information between managers and 
principals so they can publish transparent 
and reliable financial reports to give auditors 
opinion that it can increase the credibility of 
the financial statements and reduce agency 
costs that are arising from agency conflicts. 
Large companies will pay attention to their 
reputation by giving shareholders rights and 
obligations for their investments and 
maintaining creditor confidence. Therefore, 
large companies will choose a public 
accounting firm that has a good brand and 
reputation, such as Big 4/5/6 auditors.  
In this study, Big Four auditors are 
used as variables to measure audit quality 
because Big Four auditors are considered to 
have better expertise and quality in auditing 
financial statements than non-Big Four 
auditors, and they receive a higher incentive 
for detecting and disclosing material 
misstatements contained in financial 
statements so as to produce quality 
information and to maintain their reputation 
and avoid legal liability so that they will 
conduct more comprehensive oversight and 
pressure managers not to use discretionary 
accruals. Previous research (Jensen, M.C. 
and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983; and Mitchell, et al. 2008) has shown 
that the relationship of the independent audit 
committee with Big Four auditors has the 
potential to improve audit quality and the 
expertise of the audit committee is able to 
support external auditors in auditing financial 
statements. Based on the discussion above, 
the hypothesis that can be formulated is: 
H2: The effectiveness of the audit 
committee and Big Four auditor has a 
negative effect on earnings management. 
 
The Effect of Audit Committee 
Effectiveness and Tenure Audit on 
Earnings Management 
Tenure audit is the auditor's 
engagement period in providing services to 
clients. Tenure audits can have an impact on 
auditor performance related to independence, 
objectivity, emotional relations with clients, 
and also fee-audit with a long engagement 
period will cause intense relationships with 
clients so that it can affect the independence 
and objectivity of auditors in producing 
financial statements that can be trusted 
(Hamid, 2013). Based on Ministerial Decree 
No. 17/2008 article 3 about public 
accountant service, the term of the audit 
company's engagement with the client by the 
KAP is a maximum of 6 (six) consecutive 
financial years and by a public accountant is 
no longer than 3 (three) consecutive financial 
years. 
Previous research that efforts to 
examine the effect of corporate governance 
and external auditors conducted by (Arens, et 
al. 2005) and (Meixner, W. F. and Welker, 
1988), has found that with the length of the 
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auditor's involvement, the auditor will be 
better at assessing the risk of material 
misstatement by gaining insight into client 
operations and business strategies. While 
(Becker, et al. 1998) and Zgarni, et al. (2016) 
has found that audit work tenure will have an 
impact on auditor independence. Based on 
the discussion above, the hypothesis that can 
be formulated is: 
H3:  The effectiveness of the audit 
committee and a long tenure auditor has a 
positive influence on earnings management.
 
Research Methods 
The population data used in this 
study are manufacturing companies that 
focus on three sub-sectors, namely consumer 
goods, basic materials and chemical 
industries, and other industries that are listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 
2016-2018. The sample selection uses a 
purposive sampling technique which 
determines several criteria to obtain data that 
is suitable for certain criteria. From a total 
population of 138 companies, 38 companies 
do not meet the criteria. Thus, the total 
sample that can be processed is 100 
companies for three years. 
 
Table 3. 1  
Measurement Variables 
 











SPEC = (∑KAP clients in the 
industry)/(∑ all all companies in 
the industry)  x (KAP client 
assets)/( assets of all companies) 





1 = KAP BigFour 
0 = KAP non BigFour 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016; Alves, 
S. 2013) 
Nominal 
Tenure audit Independent 
The number of consecutive years 
the auditor has retained a 
particular audit firm 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016; 
Johnson, 2002; 






1 = have an AC 
0 = otherwise 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016) Nominal 
SIZEAC Moderating 
the number of members forming 
the AC 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016) Ratio 
ACIND Moderating 
Dummy 
1 = have an independent AC 
0 = otherwise 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016) Nominal 
ACEXPERT Moderating 
Dummy 
1 = includes at least one member 
with financial expertise 
0 = otherwise 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016) Nominal 
 
Variable Type Indicator Reference 
Measurement 
Scale 




(Zgarni, et al. 2016; 
Fransiska Natalia dan 
Catur Widayati, 2013; 
Kurniawansyah, D. 2016; 
Balsam, et al. 2003) 
Ratio 
 
FIRMSIZE Control Lnit (Total Aseti,t) 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016; 
Kurniawansyah, D. 2016; 
Balsam, et al. 2003) 
Ratio 
MTB Control 
Market value per share 
book value-liability 
(Zgarni, et al. 2016) Ratio 
ROA Control 
          
          
       
(Zgarni, et al. 2016; 
Balsam, et al. 2003) 
Ratio 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
Data analysis method used to test 
hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 3 is Ordinary Least 
Square. Regression analysis was used in this 
study to examine the effect of the independent 
variable (predictor, X) with the dependent 
variable (Y) (Ghozali, 2016). 
 
DAit = α + β1SCOREACit + β2SPECit + 
β3REPUTit + β4TENUREit + 
β5ACSPESit + β6ACREPUTit + 
β7ACTENUREit + β8FIRMSIZEit + 
β9Levit + β10MTBit + β11ROAit + εit 
Information: 
DA : discretionary accruals using 
the Modified-Jones Model of1995 
(Dechow, et al. 1995) 
SCOREAC : audit committee score 
REPUT  : auditor firm size (KAP Big-
4) 
SPEC : auditor with specialization 
industry 
TENURE : auditor engagement period 
ACSPEC : auditor industry 
specialization is moderated by 
SCOREAC 
ACREPUT : auditor reputation is 
moderated by SCOREAC 
ACTENURE: tenure audit is moderated 
by SCOREAC 
FIRMSIZE : natural logarithm of the 
company's total assets 
LEV : leverage 
MTB : market-to-book ratio 
ROA : return on assets 
ε  : error 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
This study uses manufacturing industries that 
focus on three sub-sectors, consumer goods, 
basic materials and chemical industries, and 
other industries by using purposive sampling 
techniques to determine research samples. 
Based on data obtained from the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2016-2018, there are 138 
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companies found, 100 of them are used as 
research samples. 
Table 4. 1 
Sample Selection 
No Information Accumulation 
1 Manufacturing 
companies listed on 




companies that do not 
publish annual reports 
in rupiah 
(75) 
3 Companies with 
incomplete data 
(9) 
4 Companies with 
annual reports in 
rupiah and end the 
period on December 
31each year 
330 
5 Outlier (30) 
 The number of 





In descriptive statistics, the results and 
the interpretation of the regression data 
processing that has been done using a 
multivariate analysis application with the IBM 
SPPS program will be explained. The results 
of data processing consist of descriptive 
statistical tests, classic assumption tests, 
correlation tests, and hypothesis testing using 





Tabel 4. 2  
Descriptive Statistic 








































































































Source : Data sekunder yang diolah SPSS, 
2016-2018 
 
Earnings management as the 
dependent variable is measured by the 
discretionary accrual (DA) that has a 
minimum value of -0.2734 and a maximum 
value of 0.7993. The mean discretionary 
shown in Table 4.2 is 0.0729 or 7.29%, it 
 
means that it is smaller than the standard 
deviation value, which is 11.73%, which 
means that there are bad data deviations and 
cause abnormal data to appear. 
Variable (SCOREAC) is the 
effectiveness of the audit committee as a 
moderating variable having a minimum value 
of -2.118 and a maximum value of 1.671. 
While the mean values obtained below the 
standard deviation values of 0.087 and 0.396, 
respectively, indicates that the data variation 
in the study sample is relatively small 
resulting in unfavorable deviations. 
The audit tenure variable which is 
denoted by TENURE in Table 4.2, shows 
that the minimum value is 1.00 and the 
maximum value is 8.00. It means that the 
auditor's engagement period for the client 
company is one year audit tenure for the 
shortest and eight years for the longest. 
While the average value obtained is 3.910 
with a standard deviation of 2.356, these 
results indicate the average value of the 
tenure variable is greater than the standard 
deviation value so that the distribution of 
data large and there is not a large gap.  
 
 
Based on the table, 85 manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange use industry-specific auditors during 
the audit process, and 215 companies are not 
audited by industry specialist auditors. From 
this, it can be concluded that the major of 
sample is not audited by industry specialist 
auditors. 
 
The number of companies audited 
by Big 4 is found to be 100 while the 
other 200 companies are audited by non-
big 4. It means that most of manufacturing 
companies used for samples is not audited 
by KAP Big-4. 
The independent variables of 
industry specialization auditors are 
moderated by the audit committee and 
notated by ACSPEC having minimum and 
maximum values of -0.3714 and 1.6714 
respectively with an average of 0.0571 and a 
standard deviation value of 0.1887. 
ACREPUT variable or the effectiveness of 
the audit committee moderating the 
reputation variable has a minimum value of -
1.2686 and a maximum value of 1.6714 with 
an average value of 0.0489. Based on the 
standard deviation of 0.2371, there is a 
relatively large variation of the data so that 
an adverse deviation occurs. Then the 
ACTENURE variable, namely the tenure 
audit variable which is moderated by the 
SCOREAC variable, has the minimum value 
of -10.5896 and the maximum value of 
13.372 with an average and standard 
deviation of 0.490 and 2.011, which means 
that there is a large distribution resulting in 
unfavorable deviations.  
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The control variables that were 
examined in this study are FIRMSIZE 
measured by the natural logarithm of the 
total assets of the company having a 
minimum value of 25,215 million rupiah and 
a maximum value of 34,368 million rupiah 
with an average of 28,424 and a standard 
deviation value of 1,654. Then the LEV 
variable (comparison of total debt and total 
assets) has a minimum    value of 0,0005 or 
0.05% and a maximum value of 3,600 while 
an average value of 0.506 or 50.6% and a 
standard deviation value of 0.381. This 
means that the companies which become the 
sample of research have an average debt of 
50.6% and the lowest debt of 0.05%. The 
MTB ratio (which compares the market 
value (MV market value of shares) with the 
book value of shares (BV value) of a 
minimum value of Rp -0,885 and a 
maximum value of Rp 82,444 with an 
average and standard deviation of 
respectively IDR 3,080 and IDR 7,764. Then 
the ROA variable has a minimum value of -
0.392 and a maximum value of 0.7129 with 
an average value of 0.0527 or 5.27% and a 
standard deviation of 0.112. However, the 
average sample company that can generate 
profits from total assets owned is only 
5.27%. While the company that can produce 








Results of Regression 
 
DAit = α + -0,010SCOREACit + 0,049SPECit 
+ -0,040REPUTit + -,002TENUREit + -
0,148ACSPESit + 0,164ACREPUTit + -
0,003ACTENUREit + -0,013FIRMSIZEit + -
0,029Levit + -0,002MTBit + 0,665ROAit + εit 
Significant Test of Individual 
Parameters (Statistical Test t) basically 
shows the effect of each independent 
variable on the dependent variable. If the 
results of t count> 0.05, the hypothesis is 
rejected. Industrial specialization auditor 
variable moderated by the audit board 
(ACSPEC) obtained a coefficient of -0.148, t 
-2,900 with a significant value of 0.004. 
With a significant value <0.05 the ACSPEC 
influence variable gives a negative influence 
on the earnings management variable which 
states that H1 is accepted. Although the 
oversight of the audit committee is 
considered not optimal because the 
significance value is above 0.05, but with the 
auditor qualification of industry 
specialization, it can reduce earnings 
management in manufacturing companies in 
Indonesia.   
The results of this study is related 
with the prior research of Balsam et al. 
(2003) and Zgarni et al. (2016), so the 
 
companies that use auditors with industry 
specialization can reduce the level of 
earnings management conducted by 
managers. The influence and performance of 
industry specialization auditors also depends 
on the legal conditions of a country, when 
the country has a weaker legal environment 
the level of earnings management will tend 
to be higher than countries with a stronger 
legal environment because both auditors and 
companies will be subject to severe penalties 
for the actions of managers who manipulate 
earnings and auditors allow companies to do 
this (Kwon, et al.  2007). 
The auditor ownership variable 
moderated by the audit committee 
(ACREPUT) has a coefficient value of 0.164 
and a t value of 3.871, with a significance of 
0.000 which <0.06 significance level of the 
positive variable ACREPUT variable and 
significant to earnings management variables 
because the direction is reversed with the 
hypothesis H2 is rejected. Rejecting the 
second hypothesis is due to ineffective 
supervision of BigFour's audit committee 
and auditors who are deemed unable to 
identify earnings management by managers 
resulting in the presence of Big Four KAP 
has not been able to reduce the level of 
earnings management in Indonesian 
manufacturing companies. the results of this 
second hypothesis test do not support the 
agency theory as said by Jensen & Meckling 
(1996), in which external auditors act as 
assessors of the reliability of financial 
statements that are free from material 
misstatements and reduce information 
asymmetries that might occur and prevent 
managers from carrying out earnings 
management.  
The moderating audit variable that is 
moderated by the audit board (ACTENURE) 
obtained a coefficient value of -0.003, and a 
t-value of -0.449, with a significant value of 
0.619> a significance level of 0.05. Thus, it 
can be denied that the ACTENURE variable 
has no effect on management earnings and 
states that H3 is rejected. The oversight 
mechanism of the audit committee and 
external auditor is the most important thing 
that can help the company to reduce agency 
conflict. However, from these findings, we 
can conclude that there is no significant 
influence between tenure audits on the 
decline in earnings management. This result 
is consistent with the empirical research of 
(Johnson 2002); (Jackson, et al. 2009); 
(Kono, 2013) because the length of auditor 
engagement is considered unable to reduce 
earnings management practices by the 
company. 
Conclusion 
This study is conducted to prove that 
the effectiveness of the audit committee's 
role as a mediator in overcoming agency 
conflicts and external auditors can reduce 
and minimize earnings management 
practices undertaken by management, 
especially in manufacturing companies in 
consumer goods, basic and chemical 
industries, and other recorded industries on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2016-
2018. Earnings management, as the 
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dependent variable, is measured by the 
accrual discretionary proxy and independent 
audit quality variables which include auditor 
industry specialization, auditor reputation, 
and audit engagement period. This study 
shows the factors that can influence earnings 
management including the effectiveness of 
audit committees; auditors with industry 
specialization; and tenure audit, leverage, 
firm size, ROA and MTB ratios. From the 
three hypotheses above, only audit 
committees and auditors with industry 
specialization which are able to prove that 
this supervision mechanism can reduce the 
level of earnings management in Indonesian 
manufacturing companies. 
According to the descriptive 
statistical test, the highest discretionary 
accrual score occurred at PT. Mustika Ratu 
Tbk. in 2017 which was audited by KAP 
Kanaka Puradiredja Suhartono, which is not 
included in the Big Four KAP, was 0.79933. 
It means that PT. Mustika Ratu Tbk. conduct 
earnings management with income 
maximization schemes. The company that 
has the lowest accrual discretionary scores 
are PT. PT. Jakarta Kyoei Steel Works Tbk. 
with score -0.27343 in 2017. This means that 
in that year, earnings management is with 
income minimization scheme and has been 
audited by KAP Muhammad Sofwan & 
Partners. 
In conducting research that examines 
the effect of audit committee effectiveness 
and audit quality on earnings management, 
there are several limitations experienced by 
the author, namely there are companies that 
do not publish financial reports either on the 
https://www.idx.co.id/ website or on the 
company's website so that reduce the number 
of study samples. Mostly, manufacturing 
companies in Indonesia still do not explain 
the profile of the audit committee in the 
company's annual report.  
Moreover, this research sample only 
focused on the manufacturing industry which 
is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
during 2016-2018. As it is known that within 
a period of 3 (three) years the condition of 
the Indonesian economy was uncertain due 
to the domino effect arising from the trade 
wars between China and the United States. 
This condition indirectly had an impact on 
commodity exports from Indonesia.  
Related to the limitations and results 
of the following research, the suggestion for 
further research is to increase the population 
to get a larger sample, so the number of 
samples is not limited to one sector to see the 
quality of financial statements so that it can 
generalize the results of research. Second, 
further research is expected to be able to add 
independent variables that can affect the 
earnings management level, for example, 
audit fees, company ownership structure, and 
IPO share offerings and use real transaction 
proxies to measure earnings management 
which are less noticed and more difficult for 
investors, regulators, and other parties 
who have interest in the financial 
statements. This is because during the audit 
process, the auditors are facing time pressure 
so they conduct audits quickly and can only 
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